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Before the Select Committee on Commerce

House of Representatives

Submission of the

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE

on

COPYRIGHT (NEW TECHNOLOGY AND PERFORMERS' RIGHTS)

AMENDMENT BILL

March 8, 2007

The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) appreciates this opportunity to submit its comments on the Copyright (New Technology and Performers' Rights) Amendment Bill ("the Bill").

IIPA is a private sector coalition formed in 1984 to represent the U.S. copyright-based industries – business, software, films, videos, music, sound recordings, books and journals, and interactive entertainment software – in achieving stronger copyright laws and enforcement worldwide. IIPA is comprised of seven trade associations (listed below), each representing a significant segment of the copyright community.

IIPA's submission focuses primarily on the provisions of the Bill (Sections 226-226E) dealing with technological protection measures. We also add some brief comments on a few other aspects of the Bill.

I. Technological protection measures (TPM)

Over the past decade, a clear global consensus has emerged about the importance of technological protection measures as a means to promote greater dissemination of copyright works in digital forms and over digital networks, including the Internet. Reflecting this consensus, the drafters of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) included provisions obligating countries acceding to the treaties to provide "adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies" against the circumvention of TPMs. WCT Article 11; WPPT Article 18. Almost every developed country besides New Zealand has now acceded to these treaties and has implemented these obligations, at least to a considerable extent, in their national law.

New Zealand has kept outside this global consensus so far. If the provisions of the Bill were adopted in their current form, New Zealand would remain outside the global consensus on this important issue. The failure to provide adequate and effective legal protections and remedies for TPMs will discourage copyright industry investment in New Zealand and is likely to slow the pace of the rollout of















new ways to bring creative works to the public there. IIPA urges the Committee to reconsider these provisions and to recommend substantial amendments to them before they are enacted. Changes are needed in four main areas:

(A) Definitions

The fundamental flaw of the definition of TPM in Clause 89 of the Bill is that it does not clearly include access controls, except to the extent that such controls are proven to have been "designed in the normal course of [their] operation to prevent or inhibit the unauthorized exercise of any rights conferred by this Act." Access controls play a critical and irreplaceable role in enabling the distribution of copyrighted materials in digital formats on an economically sound basis and with at least some degree of assurance that piracy, hacking, and misappropriation will be made more difficult. This point was apparently well understood by the drafters of the WIPO Treaties a decade ago. The effective technological measures that adherents to the Treaties must protect include all those "that restrict acts in respect of" copyrighted materials, including the act of gaining access to the material. WCT Article 11; WPPT Article 18. Denying protection to access controls could leave pirates free, for instance, to hack through technological barriers intended to limit access to paid subscribers, since unauthorized access by non-subscribers would not necessarily involve "the unauthorized exercise of any rights conferred by this Act." Technologies used by right holders to control access to their works should be specifically included in the definition of TPMs.

The definition of a "TPM spoiling device" is also cause for concern. It would apparently allow a manufacturer to intentionally design, market and distribute a device for the purpose of enabling or facilitating circumvention so long as the device is capable of <u>any</u> "significant application" other than circumvention. Thus, the provider of a circumvention tool could avoid liability so long as the tool performs some other function. A sounder approach is the one taken both by the U.S. and the European Union, under which liability is imposed on traffickers in devices that (1) are primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumvention; <u>or</u> (2) have only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than circumvention; <u>or</u> (3) are marketed for use in circumvention. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) & (b)(1); E.U. Directive, Article 6.

(B) Coverage of the act of circumventing access controls

Once the coverage of the Bill is adjusted so that access controls are protected as TPMs, it will be necessary also to prohibit the act of circumventing such controls. (Of course, to the extent that the Bill's definition already covers access controls, the failure to prohibit the act of circumvention already constitutes a gap that should be filled.) Stripping away encryption and leaving a formerly protected work "in the clear" for any and all uses should be outlawed. A legal regime that lacks this prohibition could hardly be said to satisfy a treaty obligation to provide "effective legal remedies against circumvention." WCT Article 11; WPPT Article 18.

(C) Knowledge requirements for proof of liability

The Bill does include prohibitions on trafficking in TPM spoiling devices, but Section 226A only prohibits such trafficking where the trafficker has knowledge or reason to believe that the

¹ Council Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. (L. 167) 10.

device will, or is likely to be, used for infringement. This may foreclose liability for any trafficker in TPM spoiling devices who can hypothesize a non-infringing use for the tools of his trade. Purveyors of pirate smart cards could evade the legal prohibitions by arguing that some of their customers did not infringe copyright by their illicit viewing of descrambled programs (because they are "private," not "public"). Similarly, someone who provides the tools for another to decrypt, without authorization, an encrypted work in digital form should not be allowed to escape responsibility by pleading that what the recipient of the tools did with the improperly decrypted work has not been proven to be a violation of an exclusive right of the copyright owner.

If right holders have to overcome the burden of showing that a trafficker knew or should have known that his customers would commit infringements rather than permitted acts, New Zealand's TPM provisions could encourage rather than eliminate business models that aim to benefit from piracy. The problem will become more acute as new exceptions to protection are recognized (as other provisions of the Bill propose) to which traffickers can refer to refute a claim that they knew or should have known that their tools would be used to infringe.

(D) The "qualified persons" exception

Section 226D carves two huge loopholes in what remains of the prohibition against trafficking in circumvention devices or services after the knowledge hurdle discussed above is surmounted. First, Section 226D(1) states that the trafficking prohibitions "do not prevent or restrict the exercise of a permitted act." While the scope of this provision is unclear, it could be read to say that so long as a circumvention tool is or could be used to carry out activity that falls within an exception to copyright protection, trafficking in that tool will not attract liability. Such an exception would virtually swallow the rule, since almost any circumvention device could, in theory, be used for a non-infringing purpose.

Second, Section 226D(2) specifically allows trafficking in a TPM spoiling device to allow a library, archive or school to carry out any of four activities. The first is "to exercise a permitted act," and thus seems redundant of the provision just discussed. The other three activities – to "(b) correct an error in a computer program; or (c) effect interoperability of software; or (d) undertake encryption research" – appear to be covered even to the extent they do not constitute "a permitted act," and thus even to the extent that they involve copyright infringement. This provision would provide the basis for an active market in supplying circumvention tools to a significant segment of the New Zealand economy, with remarkably few restrictions on how the recipients may use these tools. Indeed, nothing in the Bill seems to prohibit libraries, schools or archives from sharing these tools with others, so long as the ultimate result is to enable the institution to engage in non-infringing activity, or to carry out error correction, encryption research, or software interoperability, even if copyright is infringed in the course of doing so. These sweeping exceptions, which extend far beyond those recognized by any other developed country in implementing the WCT and WPPT, would largely undermine the prohibition against trafficking in circumvention devices or services.

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² Although the Bill (in Clause 43) would make some uses of computer programs for the purposes of interoperability and error correction lawful in proposed Sections 80A and 80B, Section 226D does not reference those Sections nor include precise language that would appropriately limit the purposes for which circumvention devices could be distributed to lawful uses. There does not appear to be any specific provision of the Copyright Act that creates an exception for the purpose of encryption research, and thus no evident limit on what activities could be enabled by a circumvention tool, so long as they ultimately enable a school, library or archive to perform encryption research.

II. Other issues

A. Transient Copying Exception

In Clause 23 (creating a new Section 43A), as well as in Clause 79 (creating a new Section 175A), the Bill would create a new exception to the copyright owner's exclusive right to control reproduction of his work. The parameters of such an exception for "transient or incidental" copying bear careful examination, since to a considerable and growing degree, the value of a copyright work can today be extracted by a user who never makes a permanent copy of it. Thus, an exception that is too broad in this area could easily interfere with the normal exploitation of works and thus cross the boundary of permissible exceptions and limitations on copyright, as set forth in the "three-step test" of the WTO TRIPS Agreement (Article 13) and of the Berne Convention (Article 9(2)), to both of which New Zealand has acceded.

The proposed new amendment is based upon Article 5 of the E.U. Copyright Directive. However, by its terms (see Recital 20), the E.U. Copyright Directive is subordinated to the Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, and thus the transient copying exception in the Copyright Directive does not apply to copies of computer programs under European law. Exceptions to the reproduction right for computer programs are governed by the earlier directive, in terms similar to those that either apply under New Zealand law today, see, e.g., Section 80 (back-up copy exception), or that would apply if other aspects of the Bill were enacted into law. See, e.g., proposed Section 80B (lawful use). Accordingly, any new transient copying exception to the reproduction right should not apply to computer programs.

Second, in order to minimize the risk that any exception will conflict unnecessarily with normal modes of exploitation, the exception should be confined to the situation in which an incidental transient copy is made as part of a transaction that has already been authorized by the relevant rights holder(s). This would be sufficient to prevent any overreaching or "double dipping" by right holders seeking to make such incidental reproduction, in addition to the principal transaction, a licensable event. The "independent economic significance" criterion in the proposed amendment, which is also borrowed from the E.U. Directive, may be intended as a proxy for this principle, but it adds harmful uncertainty to the legislation. For instance, this criterion could make the application of the exception depend upon whether some separately itemized charge is made for the transient copy, which may not be the case even when the gist of the transaction is making a transient copy available to the user.

Finally, there is logical tension, at least in a common law system, between (a) the concept that a provider of transmission services, such as an ISP, may in some circumstances (e.g., after sufficient notice, or with knowledge) be liable for infringement (or at least subject to an injunction) for making a transient copy, and (b) the creation of a blanket exception for all transient copies made in the course of a transmission by an intermediary, as the proposed exception seems to do. Since New Zealand law appears to accept point (a), it should hesitate to also adopt point (b). Tailoring the exception to cover only incidental copies made in the course of an authorized transaction, as suggested in the preceding paragraph, would of course accommodate the need of service providers for protection from claims in most cases. A blanket exception for intermediaries, by contrast, encourages service providers to look the other way when their role in infringing transactions is brought to their attention.

B. Library Digital Dissemination

Under new Section 56A (to be added by Clause 36 of the Bill), a library would be immune from liability for making works in its collection in digital formats available to users, both on-site and off-site.

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This new exception must be carefully scrutinized to ensure full compliance with the "three-step test" for permissible exceptions and limitations to copyright. See TRIPS Article 13; Berne Convention Article 9(2). For example, publishers of text material and reference works increasingly offer licenses to libraries for networked dissemination of their products to authenticated users (for instance, by a university library to enrolled students). To the extent that this exception would allow libraries to offer such online dissemination of these works to their users (including those off-site) without obtaining such a license, it clearly appears to interfere with the normal exploitation of these works. The same is true in the case of libraries who seek to stream digital copies of sound recordings or audio-visual works in their collections to off-site users – these are activities for which significant license fees may be charged. IIPA urges that this exception be modified to forestall these or similar scenarios in which a blanket exception for online dissemination by libraries would bypass marketplace solutions and injure the legitimate interests of right holders.

C. Other Exceptions

(1) Format-shifting and time-shifting

IIPA appreciates that the exceptions contained in Clauses 44 and 45 of the Bill are substantially narrower and more focused than in earlier proposals on these topics. Each proposal must be measured against the international standard contained in the "three-step test" of Berne Article 9(2) and TRIPS Article 13, as well as against the practical standard of whether recognition of the exception in question will discourage or distort efforts to propose market solutions. We note, in particular, that the timeshifting provision of proposed Section 84 applies to the recording for time-shifting purposes of any "communication work," a broadly defined term that includes material disseminated via any communications medium through subscription services such as pay TV, satellite radio, and the like. In this regard, the condition that the time-shifting is permissible only if the person making the copy already has lawful access to the work (proposed Section 84(1)(d)) is crucial, as is the condition in proposed Section 84(1)(c), that the person making the copy "is not able lawfully to access the communication work on demand." It may need to be clarified that if an on-demand service is available against the payment of a fee, the latter condition is not met with regard to a person who has chosen not to pay that fee and thus literally is not in a position "lawfully to access the work on demand." Rather, as we read it, Section 84(1)(c) is meant simply to address the circumstance in which on-demand access is not provided at all with respect to the work in question.

The rather detailed conditions that must be satisfied before copying a sound recording (for format-shifting purposes) or a "communication work" (for time-shifting purposes) underscore the unacceptability of allowing trafficking in tools for circumventing technological protection measures if the circumvention they enable may be carried out in order to perform a permitted act. It is almost inconceivable that a device that circumvents a TPM applied to a sound recording, or one applied to a "communication work" streamed over the Internet, will be designed so as to allow copying only when all these conditions are met, but to prevent it when any one of them is unfulfilled. For instance, no such device could "know" that on-demand access is available to a communication work, and thus that the condition imposed by proposed Section 84(1)(c) has not been satisfied. Instead, the provisions of Section 226D will enable the development of a market in devices that may easily, and perhaps predominantly, be used in an infringing manner, for the ostensible reason that, if all these conditions are met, it is also possible for them to be used without infringing.

(2) Error correction for computer programs

While IIPA certainly does not object to the general principle that copying or adapting a computer program should be permitted to the extent necessary for an authorized user to make a lawful use, the parenthetical example given in Clause 43's proposed Section 80B(1)(a) regarding error correction is readily subject to abuse and should be omitted. The reason can be simply summed up in the aphorism that "one person's bug is another person's feature." The danger is that whenever a particular computer program will not perform some function that the user wishes to make, but that the program may not have been designed to do, the user will be allowed to make unauthorized copies or adaptations of it, even in the face of the user's contractual commitment to the contrary. At a minimum, the statute should contain some objective standard for determining when there is an "error" that can only be corrected through unauthorized copying and adaptation.

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IIPA would be glad to supplement these comments or respond to questions if that would assist the Committee in its deliberations. Please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned. Thank you in advance for considering our views.

Respectfully submitted,

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