EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Special 301 Recommendation: IIPA recommends that the Russian Federation be designated a Special 301 Priority Foreign Country in 2006.\(^1\) IIPA also recommends that the United States government immediately suspend Russia’s eligibility for any duty-free trade benefits that it enjoys under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program,\(^2\) and that it condition Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on meaningful copyright law enforcement.

Simply stated, Russia’s current copyright piracy problem is enormous — one of the worst of any country in the world, resulting in losses of over $1.7 billion in 2005 (and well over $6.5 billion in just the last five years).

Piracy of all copyright materials – motion pictures, records and music, business and entertainment software, and books – is at levels ranging from a low of about 67% to a high of 85%, levels totally unacceptable for a country and economy of the size and sophistication of Russia. Moreover, exports of infringing products from Russia – which have been forensically identified in over 27 countries -- are eroding the copyright industry’s legitimate businesses in third country markets.

For nine straight years, Russia has been on the Priority Watch List, while the number of optical disc plants producing illegal material and exporting it abroad has grown exponentially—from 2 plants in 1996 to 47 plants as of January 2006. The Russian Government has run an increasing number of raids in the last few months of 2005. While this is a positive step, it can hardly qualify as rising to the level of needed enforcement. In the past four years, the number of optical disc (i.e., CD and/or DVD) plants in Russia has more than tripled. These plants are, in essence, unregulated, with only a handful subject to surprise inspections (although most were apparently “inspected” in 2005 according to the Russian Government), or the seizure of material, and almost none have been the subject of the imposition of effective criminal enforcement for commercial piracy or the seizure of the equipment used in illegal production. Effective enforcement means that plants involved in the manufacture of illegal material must be closed, plant operators convicted and sentenced, and the machinery used to conduct this piracy must be seized and destroyed.

\(^1\) As detailed below, the Business Software Alliance (BSA) joins this recommendation solely as a result of the Russian government’s failure to take effective action against the broad distribution of counterfeit software over the Internet, primarily through unsolicited e-mails (spam) originating from groups operating in Russia. BSA notes the adoption in July 2004 of positive improvements to the Copyright Law, and recognizes the willingness of Russian law enforcement agencies to take action against channel piracy (i.e., illegal software preloaded on computers sold in the marketplace), not only in the Moscow area, but also in other Russian regions. In addition, BSA is appreciative of progress made in software legalization in the public sector.

\(^2\) For more details on Russia’s Special 301 history, see IIPA’s “History” appendix to filing at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2006SPECIAL301HISTORICALSUMMARY.pdf. Please also see previous years’ reports at http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html.
Russia received over $617.9 million in just the first 11 months of 2005 in GSP trade preferences. IIPA recommends that the U.S. government immediately suspend Russia’s eligibility for GSP trade benefits and that the U.S. use other trade measures — including denying entry into the WTO — to get the Russian government to make progress on copyright enforcement. To date, the Russian government has taken only sporadic action against optical disc plants (with raids and seizures of some infringing product) and a handful of prosecutions, in addition to the adoption of legal reforms. Russia must make meaningful and measurable enforcement progress against a problem that has escalated due to Russian government inaction.

**Enforcement Steps for 2006:** Russia must make enforcement its highest IPR priority to (1) stem the explosive growth of illegal optical media plants run by organized crime syndicates with widespread distribution networks; and (2) improve overall enforcement, in particular, focusing on deterrent criminal penalties addressing the problem of persistent commercial piracy.

There are several critical steps that the Russian government could take immediately to effectively confront its optical disc and related piracy problems:

1. Inspect, on a regular, unannounced and continuous basis, each of the 47 known OD plants, and immediately close and seize the machinery used to produce pirate product (some of these steps may require additional legislative or regulatory measures);
2. Introduce, either via executive order or legislation, the necessary modifications of the optical disc licensing regime so that it clearly provides more effective control over the operations of the plants, including the granting of licenses to legal plants and the withdrawal of licenses and the sanctioning of illegal plants; stricter controls on the importation of polycarbonate and machinery; mandatory seizure and destruction of machinery used to produce pirate materials; and the introduction of criminal penalties for the owners of such plants. In addition, any plant licensing regime (including current law) should extend in scope to the operators of telecine machines and mastering laboratories used to pirate audiovisual works;
3. Announce, from the office of the President, that fighting copyright piracy is a priority for the country and law enforcement authorities, and instruct the Inter-Ministerial Commission, headed by the Prime Minister, to deliver reports every three months to the President on what steps have been taken to address the problem. Also, it is imperative to establish a central coordinating body for law enforcement authorities with wide powers, derived directly from the President, to combine the efforts of the Economic Crime Police, the Police of Street Order, Police Investigators (who investigate major cases from the beginning to trial) and Department K (the New Technologies Police);
4. Adopt in the Supreme Court a decree setting forth sentencing guidelines for judges—advising the courts to impose deterrent penal sanctions as provided under the penal code as amended (Article 146). We understand such a decree may be proposed as early as February 2006. We also recommend amending Article 146 to a minimum penalty of six years, not the current penalty of five years (since only penalties of six or more years are treated as “serious” crimes);
5. Immediately take down websites offering infringing copyright materials, such as allofmp3.com (music), www.threedollardvd.com (films/music) and www.fictionbook.ru (books), and criminally prosecute those responsible, including unauthorized collecting societies (such as ROMS) that purport to grant licenses for rights that they do not possess;
6. Improve border enforcement, including the import of machinery used to produce illegal product and the export of large shipments of that product abroad;
7. Initiate investigations into and criminal prosecutions of organized criminal syndicates that control piracy operations in Russia (including operations that export pirate material to markets outside Russia);
8. Encourage the Economic Police (including the Anti-Fraud Department) to substantially increase the number of anti-piracy raids, especially against large-scale targets, and to extend their actions to the distribution networks supplying illegal street sellers as well as to bring more cases to the prosecutors; and
9. Take action to undo the situation in St. Petersburg, where legitimate video and DVD markets have been effectively lost due to the activities of a collective management organization known as the Association of Collective Management of Authors’ Rights (which falsely claims to represent MPA member companies and which, incredibly, enjoys the support and protection of local officials, and requires, in violation of federal law, the application of a pirate hologram on all products sold with its license).

Along with these steps, the Russian police and prosecutors must show significant improvement in the number and disposition of criminal cases brought against commercial pirates (especially the organized criminal enterprises).

In 2004, Russia adopted important law reforms to bring its laws into compliance with the 1992 Bilateral NTR Trade Agreement and the Berne Convention by, among other things, providing protection of pre-existing works and sound recordings. There are numerous other legal reforms, especially those targeted to improved enforcement, that Russia must make, including further updating the criminal code, the criminal procedure code, and administrative code (as detailed in this and prior reports). Criminal procedure amendments intended to enable more efficient prosecution of cases are pending in the State Duma and may be adopted in 2006. Amendments to the Code of Administrative Misdemeanors were adopted in 2005, and will enter into force in 2006.

Most importantly, Russia needs to seriously address the problem of optical disc piracy that has been “discussed” for far too long without meaningful action. Nearly ten years ago there were only two optical disc plants. IIPA and the U.S. government identified plant production as an important “emerging problem” in Russia, and suggested the need for an enforcement “action plan” to address it, including legislative reforms. At all levels of the Russian government there have been promises to address this problem (starting in 1999), including a 2002 pledge, never fulfilled, to issue an “action plan.” But to date, there has been no effective action taken against the plants, no comprehensive plan of action issued by the Russian government, and no legislative reforms have even been introduced to tackle optical disc plants’ unauthorized activities.
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT

Illegal Optical Media Production and Distribution

There are now 47 known optical disc plants in Russia manufacturing and distributing products (including music CDs, DVDs, videogames, and VCDs); at least 24 of the plants have been confirmed to be producing pirate product. The Russian government has publicly stated that as many as 18 plants are located on government owned or leased property; these plants on former military bases are known as “Russian State (owned) Restricted Access Regime Enterprises” (RARE). These RARE plants are directly connected to state owned and state run enterprises, and are located on premises important to Russian state security officials. Thus, they not only pose a potential security risk for the Russian government, they also undermine the government’s campaign against piracy. As of March 2005, Ministry of Interior officials and State Trade Inspectors were granted the authority to have 24-hour access to RARE facilities in order to conduct plant raids (which are otherwise off-limits to local enforcement authorities). MOI officials and State Trade Inspectors need to use their authority to undertake surprise inspections, including the seizure of illegal material and the closure of illegal plants.

The 47 optical disc plants have a total plant capacity of 395 million CDs and DVDs per year (with an estimated actual production of between 150 and 200 million discs per year). There are estimated to be a total of 113 lines of production at these plants, with 51 lines dedicated to DVD production, up from 34 just one year ago. The local legitimate market is significantly less

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3 The methodology used by IIPA member associations to calculate these estimated piracy levels and losses is described in IIPA’s 2006 Special 301 submission, and is available on the IIPA website at www.iipa.com/pdf/2006spec301methodology.pdf.
4 MPAA’s trade losses and piracy levels for 2005 are available for a limited number of countries and are based on a methodology that analyzes physical or “hard” goods and Internet piracy. For a description of the new methodology, please see Appendix B of this report. As loss numbers and piracy levels become available for additional countries at a later time, they will be posted on the IIPA website, http://www.iipa.com.
5 BSA’s 2005 statistics are preliminary. They represent the U.S. publishers’ share of software piracy losses in Russia, and follow the methodology compiled in the Second Annual BSA/IDC Global Software Piracy Study (May 2005), available at http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/ . These figures cover, in addition to business applications software, computer applications such as operating systems, consumer applications such as PC gaming, personal finance, and reference software. BSA’s 2004 piracy statistics were preliminary at the time of IIPA’s February 11, 2005 Special 301 filing; the 2004 data has been revised and is reflected above.
6 ESA’s reported dollar figures reflect the value of pirate product present in the marketplace as distinguished from definitive industry “losses.” The methodology used by the ESA is further described in Appendix B of this report.
than this figure. For example, it is estimated that the current demand for legitimate DVDs is about 10 million discs per year but that Russian plants are now manufacturing between 50 and 80 million DVDs per year for export to markets outside of Russia.

The steady growth of optical disc production has been documented (in numerous IIPA filings) as follows: 1996—two plants; 1998—three plants; 1999—six plants, with a capacity of 60 million discs; 2000—ten plants, with a capacity of 90 million discs; 2001—thirteen plants, with a capacity of 150 million discs; 2002—seventeen plants, with a capacity of between 150 and 183 million discs; 2003—twenty-six plants (including 5 DVD plants), with a capacity exceeding 300 million discs; 2004—thirty-four plants (including 8 DVD plants), with a capacity exceeding 390 million discs.

In 2005, the Russian government undertook raids against some of the plants – certainly a positive step, but merely a first step. In fact, the government claimed to have conducted “inspections” of all the known plants, although they were not surprise inspections even if all the plants were visited. In our view the Russian government did not raid the plants in any comprehensive way, nor do they have a comprehensive plan to address the optical media production and distribution problem. Instead, of the 18 plant visits (“raids”) of which we are aware (with as many as nine in September and October 2005 alone), the authorities only discovered evidence of illegal production at six plants, essentially finding the remaining 12 plants “clean.” This “cleanliness” should not be misinterpreted; it likely resulted because many visits were not surprise inspections. We applaud the increase in plant inspection activity—an increase that led to the seizure of increased quantities of piratical goods. But taken in context, these raids are not sufficient to address the escalating piracy problem. For example, it is reported that over 6 million DVDs were seized in all of 2005. But the motion picture industry reports that as many as 50 to 80 million discs were produced for export alone in 2005.

The end results of the 2005 (and 2004) raids are telling, and underscore the significant amount of work Russia must undertake to address the piracy problem as well as to meet its bilateral (including GSP eligibility) and multilateral obligations.

It would appear that almost all of the optical disc plants that were raided in 2004 and 2005 remain in operation after those raids. A raid in November 2005 on the Roff plant in Odintsovo, near Moscow, led to a suspension of a license while a criminal prosecution proceeds. This was the first such suspension (by the new Federal Service charged with compliance with licensing regulations) and several other suspensions were announced in January 2006. More common, however, has been, for example, the case of a several plants raided (in 2004) where truckloads of illegal material were seized weeks later from the same plants by Russian government enforcement officials – and still these same plants remain in operation and their licenses have not been suspended by the Ministry of Culture (i.e., the Federal Licensing Service – Rosokhrankultura).

Most fundamentally, the plant owners remain unscathed by the criminal justice system. A few plant employees have been convicted – after extensive delays in criminal investigations – but virtually all received suspended sentences. Consequently, there is no deterrence to continuing to conduct commercial piracy in Russia at present. The only exception to this pattern was in June 2002 when the Disc Press MSK plant (raided in September 1999) was finally closed and a Zelenograd court handed down four-year prison sentences to two operators of the plant. The more typical case is that of the Synograph plant, raided in October 2000. There was a four-year criminal investigation aimed at the director of the plant; a court hearing was supposed to be completed last year, but the plant is still in operation.
The record industry has been involved in 38 cases against optical disc plants and large warehouses in the past three years. Thirty-two of those 38 cases (that is, 84%) remain without a resolution as investigations have dragged on or have been terminated without just cause or based on ill-founded assertions (such as, no corpus delicti or no suspects identified). The other six cases resulted in conditional sentences, and in only a handful of cases were the pirated materials destroyed. Thus, these enforcement measures have had little or no impact on reducing piracy in Russia.

A raid in November 2005 by RAPO and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) on the Roff Technologies plant in Odintsovo near Moscow resulted in the seizure of thousands of pirate DVDs, CDs, and stampers, along with illegal molds (i.e., molds without the plant’s name and licensing number, as required by licensing regulations). The plant had been previously raided in September (by RAPO) and the Economic Crime Police in October. The November raid led to the suspension of the plant’s license while a criminal investigation (and hopefully, prosecution) proceeds. This is the first suspension case by the new federal service charged with securing compliance with the existing licensing regulations.

To solve this problem, Russia must undertake vigorous criminal enforcement (not, as they suggest, private party action) backed by the highest political officials in the government, since much of the piracy is undertaken by organized criminal syndicates. For example, according to the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), Russian organized crime syndicate pirates of videogame material are so well entrenched that they “label” their product. Russian-produced pirated entertainment software products are also localized into Russian and the language of the country to which the pirate exports are destined (for instance, Poland). Pirated videogames produced in Russia have been found in neighboring Eastern European countries, and as far away as Israel. The Motion Picture Association (MPA) reports that DVDs are being locally produced in seven or eight foreign languages, not including Russian, indicating that the organized crime syndicates are producing these DVDs strictly for export. Markets that have been negatively impacted by imports of pirate Russian DVDs include: Poland, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. The music industry reports that Russian produced CDs have been found in many of these same countries – over 25 in all.

To date, the Russian Government (formerly the Ministry of Press and Mass Media) has been using reproduction and licensing regulations — issued in June 2002 — to provide licenses for replication facilities for optical discs and analog tapes. The regulations allow for unannounced inspections of replication plants and for the suspension, but not withdrawal, of operating licenses of facilities found to be in breach of the regulations. This is why the provisions are inadequate—because even blatantly pirating plants cannot have their licenses revoked (withdrawn) absent a court order. Another major shortcoming is the lack of deterrent criminal penalties for such violations and the inability to seize and confiscate the equipment used for pirate production.

After the 2004 government reorganization, a new enforcement authority (the federal service known by the acronym FSCLMM—Federal Service for Supervising Compliance with Laws Regarding Mass Communications and the Protection of Cultural Heritage) took over the plant licensing function; its role is to issue plant operating licenses. The FSCLMM (also known as Rosokhrankultura) is a part of the Ministry of Culture. Rosokhrankultura has responsibility only for the licensing of optical disc plants that produce music or DVDs, not computer software (according to Federal Law No. 80-FZ “On Licensing of Certain Types of Activities”). There was a delay after the transfer of authority to Rosokhrankultura, with inspections and licensing reviews
commencing again only in May 2005. The Russian Government reported at the end of 2005 that it “inspected” all of the known plants in operation. A separate result of the 2004 government reorganization was that copyright policy is now vested in the new Federal Service on Intellectual Property (including Rospatent) within the Ministry of Education and Science setting up the potential for bureaucratic wrangling over certain aspects of optical disc enforcement.

In October, November, and December 2005, several plants were raided as part of a large-scale police operation (“Kontrafakt-2005”). Rosokhrankultura reported in January 2006 that three plants had their licensees revoked as a result of those raids: the Data Media plant, located in Korolev, near Moscow (raided October 5, 2005); the UVK Stimul plant in Moscow (suspended December 12, 2005); and the Laguar plant in Podolsk, near Moscow (suspended January 23, 2006). Further, according to a press release issued by Rosokhrankultura in December 2005, six more lawsuits were filed to revoke licenses from other plants producing illegal disks.

As noted, according to special regulations adopted by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in March 2005, MOI officers have the right to 24-hour access to all “restricted access” (RARE) facilities for the purpose of conducting raids on optical disc plants located on these restricted access (RARE) properties. The full scope of MOI’s authority remains unclear, however. It is hoped that MOI will use whatever authority it possesses to suspend the operations of enterprises involved in piracy, and to seize piratical goods and the machinery used to manufacture them pending a (court) order for destruction. Further, IIPA hopes that Rosokhrankultura will suspend plant licenses immediately upon presentation of evidence of piratical activity, and that the courts will act promptly to issue license revocation orders thereafter, as was the case with respect to the Laguar optical disc plant, noted above, which had its license revoked at the end of January upon a motion from Rosokhrankultura.

The business software industry has also seen an increase in optical disc piracy in recent years and the sale of discs (including “burned” discs) in the Russian market, as well as Russian produced discs exported and sold in many other countries. Under the current optical disc regulations, the reproduction of software on optical discs is not even subject to licensing (only audio and video works are covered). Amendments to correct this deficiency were proposed by the Ministry of Culture in April 2005.

In short, the existing laws and regulations pertaining to plant licensing fall far short of IIPA’s model optical disc legislation (provided to the Government of Russia), and is demonstrably inadequate—evidenced by the fact that the existence of these regulations has done little to stem, or even slow, the production of pirate discs in the country’s optical disc facilities. Until better provisions exist, however, the existing laws must be utilized to the fullest extent possible. Draft resolutions and legislation have started to circulate to change optical disc licensing requirements, including a much-needed proposal to adopt mandatory SID codes. In 2005, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade drafted legislation to regulate the importation of polycarbonates used in the production of optical media; that draft is now circulating for approval before introduction. In the absence of a comprehensive scheme, however, the existing regulations, and any piecemeal additions, must be seen as a starting point for action. In the long run, a comprehensive series of legal reforms is needed. These include legislative and regulatory steps—proposals that IIPA gave to the Russian government more than four years ago.
Raids and Seizures in 2005

In 2005, there were 21 actions taken against optical disc plants, including raids and seizure of illegal materials (but not at all the raids) according to industry and Russian government reports. In 2004, there was a total of eight actions taken. As noted, in almost all cases the plant operators go unscathed by the criminal justice system and/or the plants continue in operation.

In 2005, the recording industry was involved in raids on seven suspect optical disc plants. One of these plants was raided on three separate occasions. Prosecutors initiated criminal investigations in four cases, rejected a proceeding in one, and have yet to announce anything with respect to the other two. The recording industry is hopeful that the 2005 results will be better than in 2004 when out of eight total cases, two were rejected, two remain open, one case was suspended, and the three other cases resulted in conditional sentences applied to low-level plant employees.

In 2005, the motion picture industry’s anti-piracy organization, RAPO, participated in 10 raids on suspect DVD plants, including raids on plants in Zelenograd, Moscow, Tver and Kazan. The plant in Kazan, Tatarstan that was raided in October 2005 is a RARE facility. As a result, local authorities who tried to raid the plant were prevented from doing so by the federal authorities, but were ultimately successful (along with RAPO). In early December 2005, RAPO and the Economic Police found a second unlicensed plant on a large defense facility in Kazan that contained 2 DVD and 3 CD lines, and over 300,000 pirate discs. The plant in Tver that was also raided in early December 2005 was found to have 4 unlicensed DVD lines and over 21,000 pirate DVDs. The lines were sealed by the local Economic Crime Police.

In virtually all cases where plants were raided in 2005, it is reported that the plants remain in operation. In general, the industries report that criminal investigations now proceed in about half (up from 33%) of the cases (not only including the plant-related cases). However, extensive prosecutorial delays persist and few cases result in criminal convictions and almost none against the operators and owners of the plants. In 2005, a total of only nine pirate offenders (and no plant operators) were jailed.

In December 2005, the City Court of Pushkino, near Moscow, imposed a two-year prison sentence (not suspended) on a local DVD retailer, who was caught by RAPO earlier last year selling pirate DVDs (between 400 and 500 discs). The defendant (a former Russian Army officer) was charged under Article 146(3) of the Criminal Code, which deals with IP offenses committed by organized groups—this defendant had conducted his business with family members. The defendant was likely convicted because of his blatant sales, which continued after the raid and right up to his trial, and his defense, which angered the court when he noted that he was merely serving the “poor people of Pushkino” who could not afford to buy legitimate DVDs. This case was the first time that a Russian court imprisoned a first-time IP offender (a victory for RAPO and the local prosecutor). In August 2004, the Russian courts punished a pirate with the first-ever unsuspended prison sentence. The defendant, a video shop owner found with a DVD burner and hundreds of pirate DVDs, DVD-Rs and VHS cassettes, was sentenced to 3 years and 2 months after a prior conviction had resulted in a two-year suspended sentence.

To address retail piracy, two years ago, the government of Russia adopted a legal ban on the street sales of audio and audiovisual products, for example, at kiosks, especially in
Moscow. This was a promising step that resulted, at least in the short term, in a significant reduction in the availability of pirated home video entertainment, especially on the streets of Moscow. However, the ban has been irregularly enforced and music CDs and DVDs remain widely available. Piracy in retail outlets such as in supermarkets (large and small), specialty (CD/DVD) shops, and large kiosks, is rampant. Retail cases have resulted in some administrative fines, but these are generally of a de minimis nature. IIPA understands that amendments to the law to be considered in 2006 would expand the scope of this ban to (business and entertainment) software and databases; we recommend its immediate enactment.

The pattern of successful raids without successful prosecutions (with a few exceptions) is a recurring problem. It is estimated that about two-thirds of pirated product seized in raids in Russia finds its way back into the market through either the Veteran’s Fund or the Trade Houses in the Ministry of Justice, which both claim the right to sell pirate discs on the open market. The government of Russia must put a stop to these practices.

In November 2005, a large Ministry of Interior operation called "Counterfeit" was undertaken—it resulted in police raids at numerous markets (including Gorbushka, Mitino and Solntsevo) and warehouses, especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the seizure of hundreds of thousands of pirate discs.

On December 15, 2005, RAPO investigators and officers from the Ministry of Interior’s IP Department No. 28 raided a warehouse in the Khimki district of Moscow and seized over 500,000 pirate discs (mostly DVDs). The raid was organized by RAPO following an earlier police search of a truck in Klin that yielded about 60,000 pirate discs. Subsequent investigations revealed that two trucks made three-times-a-week deliveries from an optical disc plant in St. Petersburg to Moscow via Klin (with materials stored at a warehouse in Khimki). Among the titles seized in the raid were recent releases: *Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire*, *The Fog*, *The Interpreter*, *Stealth*, *The Terminal*, and *Robots*. RAPO investigators also participated in a raid December 14, 2005 with the local Economic Crime Police at a warehouse in Narofominsk, seizing 180,000 pirate DVDs.

The Business Software Alliance (BSA) reports on an optical disc plant raid that took place on November 17, 2005. The Economic Crime Police of Moscow raided the Uniteknoploplast Ltd. plant located in Lobnya. The police seized a number of CD stampers, moulds for CD replication and counterfeit CDs, including some containing illegal Microsoft software. Preliminary damage estimates exceed $1 million. An investigation and examination of the seized CDs and stampers is underway, along with the initiation of a criminal case.

**Continued High Piracy Levels and Other Problems**

The piracy levels and dollar losses in Russia are very high for an economy as well developed as the Russian market. These high piracy levels cost the Russian economy millions of dollars in lost jobs and lost taxes. For example, the motion picture industry alone estimates lost tax revenues on DVDs and videos in Russia at $130 million in 2005. In another study undertaken by the software industry (BSA/IDC Study, December 2005), it was estimated that if levels of piracy could be reduced by 10 points, it would add $23.5 billion to the Russian economy and create 33,700 new jobs—more jobs than are currently employed in Russia’s hardware, software, and services sector combined. It would also generate $15 billion in local industry revenues and $823 million in tax revenues.
The motion picture industry reports very high piracy rates for DVDs, despite significant increases in the number of households with DVD players as well as efforts by foreign producers to quickly get legitimate locally replicated DVDs into the Russian market and to lower the prices of legitimate product. Evidence that piracy is negatively impacting home video sell-through revenues is revealed by comparing box office growth with home video growth. Between 2000 and 2003, box office spending in Russia rose by a cumulative 438%, compared with only 75% cumulative growth for home video sell-through over the same period. This runs counter to the trend in virtually every other country where the motion picture industry does business, where home video grew much faster than box office revenue during the last three years. Television piracy, especially outside of Moscow, remains a problem, and cable piracy abuses outside of Moscow are rampant.

The recording industry reports that the closure of the former Gorbushka market resulted in the migration of illegal sales to the nearby building of the Rubin Trade Center (La-La Park), where most of the dealers sell pirate audio products. New pirate markets are prospering on the outskirts of Moscow (for example, Tsaritsinio, Mitino, etc.). A major raid was undertaken by the police and RAPO against the Tsaritsinio market on January 28, 2005 (netting 67,000 discs and temporarily closing 52 shops in the market); five criminal investigations have commenced, with more cases expected. Audiocassette piracy levels remain very high (above 68%), as well as CD piracy (over 65%), despite major raiding activity and the expenditure of major resources by IFPI. Overall losses in the recording industry were $475.9 million in 2005.

The level of piracy for entertainment software is 82% of the market. Russian syndicates continue to control 100% of the production and distribution of PlayStation® and PlayStation2® videogames and personal computer games. Pirated entertainment software products on optical disc that are not produced in the country are typically imported from Ukraine. Cartridge-based video games (like Nintendo Game Boy® products) continue to be imported from Asia, particularly China. Although pirated entertainment software products continue to be available in Moscow, a growing industry presence is resulting in promising changes to the city’s market. However, piracy remains rampant in other key cities such as St. Petersburg and Vladivostok where organized criminal syndicates control piracy operations. Piracy at Internet cafés remains problematic; of the 9,000 cafés in the country, only about 10% are licensed. Flea-market type venues (of which there are an estimated 50,000 in the country) continue to be a primary source of pirated video game product. Internet piracy also increased significantly in 2005.

One example of the failure of the Russian enforcement regime to work effectively is the control that criminal syndicates continue to have over entertainment software piracy in Russia. There are four principal criminal syndicates which control the production and distribution of pirated entertainment software in Russia, and the scope of their operations does not appear to have diminished. The syndicates attach “logos” or “brand” names to their illegal product and localize the illegal copies they produce even before legitimate product is released into the market. These same syndicates control not only the illegal distribution networks in Russia but the distribution networks in the surrounding countries to which Russian-sourced pirated products are exported. It is widely believed that the Russian groups control piracy operations in much of Eastern Europe, including the markets in Poland and Latvia, and that these groups are strengthening their ties with the syndicates operating in Ukraine. Given these circumstances, it is imperative to use the criminal code against organized criminal syndicates, and for the

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7 As reported in the 2005 IIPA report, one of these piracy syndicates attempted to register an ESA member company’s trademarks for a videogame product that was being pirated by the syndicate.
Russian Government to focus its attention on a course of action to fight piracy by the criminal syndicates.

Book piracy continues to hurt the publishing industry in Russia. Although increased licensing of legitimate product has sporadically resulted in some improvement in the piracy rates, significant and lasting improvement has remained elusive. While bestsellers were the target of the pirates in the past, popular items for pirates now also include an array of reference works and textbooks, increasingly a large market in Russia as the penetration of English-language materials in the market grows. Unlicensed imports of pirated reprints from neighboring countries, and pirated reference books and medical texts, still abound. Illegal commercial photocopying is also a problem, especially in the academic sector. In addition, the “hidden print run” and “overrun” problems remain, where printers of legitimate editions deliver additional unauthorized copies to unauthorized distributors before delivering books to legitimate publishers.

Publishers are also experiencing a degree of Internet piracy, mostly in the form of unlicensed translations of fiction bestsellers available for download on websites in Russia. Many of these websites, such as www.fictionbook.ru and www.gribuser.ru that offer entire books for download, are operating without any interference from Russian authorities even after repeated requests for investigations. The Association of American Publishers (AAP) estimates losses in Russia in 2005 at $42 million.

In December 2005, a senior Putin Administration member repeated a theme of the Russian government regarding the “pricing” of legal versus illegal product in Russia. For several years Russian officials have suggested that the high prices for legitimate goods are to blame for the piracy problem. These comments frankly raise serious questions about the commitment of the government of Russia to fighting piracy and reflect both an ignorance of what is happening in the marketplace, and a misunderstanding of the nature of the problem that we confront in Russia. The criminal enterprises manufacturing and distributing pirate product are largely servicing foreign markets (at least for music and film), making the Russian price for legitimate materials wholly irrelevant to their motivation or profitability. As noted earlier, Russian manufactured product has been found in at least 27 countries over the past few years. In addition, existing efforts by certain industries to offer low cost Russian editions have not had the effect of reducing piracy rates. The record industry, for example, is already manufacturing locally, and sells legitimate copies for an average price of $6 to $8 dollars—a price that is extremely low, not just in relation to prices for music elsewhere, but also with respect to other consumer goods sold in Russia. The motion picture producers have also lowered the prices of DVDs offered in certain Russian markets to about $10. Similarly, entertainment software products are already reasonably priced. It is not the price of legitimate product that is creating opportunities for piracy—it is the opportunity for easy profits that has brought criminal enterprises into this business, and Russia must stop offering such excuses for its inaction.

Criminal Enforcement

The criminal enforcement system in Russia remains the weakest link in the Russian copyright regime, resulting in the extraordinarily high piracy levels and trade losses. At the retail level, there is no practical alternative for running anti-piracy actions other than using the municipal authorities (even though the criminal police have the authority—they just do not use it), and in these cases pirates are subject to administrative, not criminal, remedies that have proven ineffective. Although legislative efforts were undertaken (in 2003) to “fix” the Criminal Code, implementation of these provisions remains troubling.
Tracking cases for over five years, we note that less than one-third of the criminal cases were even heard by the courts, with the other two-thirds of cases dismissed for a variety of reasons. In only 20% of the criminal cases heard were the offenders punished at all—often with small fines, confiscation of pirate products, or suspended sentences—and, according to Russian statistics provided to IIPA, less than 1% (8 out of 338) of those convicted of IPR crimes (including copyrights and trademarks) were sentenced to any jail time; a few were fined but most of these were not deterrent fines. For example, the Russian Government reported that, as of December 1, 2005, a total of 1,592 cases were undertaken under Article 146 of the Criminal Code, with 1,513 being “grave harm” cases. This includes all IPR cases (including trademark and patent cases as well as copyright ones). Further, the Russian Government reported that 1,127 of these cases went to the courts.

It appears that the criminal enterprises are also using the Internet as a means of distributing their counterfeit products. The business software industry reports that there is a persistent problem of counterfeit software promoted and sold all over the world using unsolicited e-mail advertisements (spam) and via mail-order. These spam e-mails originate from an organization operating under various names: CD Cheap, OEM CD Shop, OEM Software, and other aliases. Most of the counterfeit products are mailed to consumers from Yekaterinburg and other cities in the Sverdlovsk region. The spam and scam operation is apparently run by a well connected, sophisticated Russian criminal network. In 2004 two police raids and related arrests were carried out in Yekaterinburg, but the key figures were not touched and there was no noticeable impact on this criminal enterprise.

Internet piracy is also growing. The world’s largest server-based pirate music website – alofmp3.com – remains in operation after a criminal prosecutor in early 2005 reviewed the case and (wrongly) determined that current Russian copyright law could not prosecute or prevent this type of activity. The case is on appeal. In fact, this interpretation of the Russian law is contrary to all the assurances the Russian government gave the U.S. government and private sector during the years-long adoption of amendments to the 1993 Copyright Law; those amendments were finally adopted in July 2004. This site sells American and other foreign-owned music to consumers worldwide and must be shut down. In addition, the role of unauthorized collecting societies must be curtailed. ROMS, in particular, has continued its illegal practice of issuing licenses for the Internet distribution of sound recordings owned by RIAA members, despite the fact that ROMS has no rights to do so. Other rogue collecting societies have since followed ROMS’ example. In October 2005, Russian police ran a raid on one unauthorized music site (mp3search.ru) but have not acted against the more notorious and larger alofmp3.com site. There are other sites offering infringing copyright materials of films and music (such as, www.threedollardvd.com) and books (www.fictionbook.ru and www.gribuser.ru) that also need to be criminally investigated, closed down, and prosecuted.

The business software industry (BSA) reported the following enforcement statistics for January through December 2005: there were 93 end-user raids and 156 “channel” raids undertaken. There were 152 criminal/administrative actions, compared with 52 civil actions. There was a total of 9 civil and 47 criminal judgments received and overall, the number of software enforcement actions increased.

The software industry noted several favorable criminal court decisions against small resellers selling pirate CD-Rs in 2005. For example, in one case, a reseller received a three-year suspended sentence plus three years of probation. In October 2005, a criminal court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced an on-site installer to a year of actual imprisonment. In some instances criminal courts also ruled on the civil matters in the cases. In 2005, the business
software industry continued to focus its enforcement activities on the prevention of hard disc loading (“HDL piracy”) by computer resellers, and on the illegal use of software by corporate end-users (“end-user piracy”). The industry reported that both channel and end-user cases were conducted with good police cooperation; there were even some “first ever” actions, but that much more sustained action is needed. The police throughout many regions were willing to undertake HDL actions, even against larger companies. Police in Moscow conducted HDL test purchases in stores of four top-10 computer retail companies (including the largest Russian retail chain), resulting in criminal verdicts against store employees (but not owners). There was also an increase in the number of end-user raids and criminal prosecutions against end-user companies throughout all of Russia, but end-user enforcement still remains very limited in Moscow. The police continued to concentrate on easy (small) CD-R targets. Finally, prosecutors throughout the country remain very reluctant to bring charges against companies using unlicensed software in their business operations.

For effective enforcement against software (and other) piracy, the business software industry recommends that the Interior Ministry and the Prosecutor’s Office publish detailed methodologies on how to collect and fix evidence pertaining to IPR crimes committed on the Internet. Such recommendations should focus on fixing and retaining electronic evidence of IP violations. Since IPR cases against Internet piracy are relatively new, the software industry further recommends that these cases be referred to the Department K (high tech) police officers.

In sum, the main criminal enforcement obstacles confronting the software industry (but common to other industries) are: (1) the poor coordination between police and the prosecution; (2) the reluctance of prosecutors to initiate and pursue IPR cases; (3) the failure of prosecutors to conduct expeditious and effective investigations and prosecutions of IPR crimes -- prosecutors create considerable delays (of months or even years) after police conduct raids; and (4) the role of political influences and corruption in cases.

Administrative Enforcement

As in past years, retail cases are increasingly handled under administrative machinery, resulting in very small fines, or none at all. While pirate product is generally confiscated, shop operators are normally not the owners and the latter seldom get caught and fined. As in past years, the recording, business software and motion picture industries report numerous administrative raids. However, it was also reported that these raids were less effective than in prior years because the new administrative code is more complicated, requiring the involvement of attorneys. In 2004, IFPI reported that 1,300 raids against audio pirates were undertaken, many of which resulted in administrative actions; no such statistics were available in 2005. Over the past few years, the average administrative fine imposed was about US$50 per case; this is obviously not a deterrent penalty. RAPO reported that it is able to average nearly ten administrative court decisions a week against pirate retailers; illegal product is confiscated and small fines imposed (on average, less than US$200). Market seizures continue to involve the employment of huge resources, since administrative penalties remain totally inadequate to deter over the long term. The recording industry reported that although the law makes liable those who distribute material, the sources and channels of illegal material are rarely pursued. In lieu of this, most administrative actions against shop owners and sellers require payment of, on average, US$200.
Civil Enforcement

In 2003, the recording industry (IFPI) commenced civil claims against optical disc plants in Russia, seeking damages of millions of dollars, a prohibition against production of the pirate CD titles named in the suits, and confiscation of the machinery and equipment used by the plants. This was the first time that civil causes of action were commenced in Russia against optical disc plants. IFPI was being pressed to do so by the Russian government, which was convinced that civil procedures would prove effective. There are now a total of 16 IFPI civil claims lodged against two plants—Russobit and Roff Technologies. Predictably, instead of this course proving effective, those cases have been bogged down with procedural hurdles that will likely mean that there will be either no resolution, or a total vindication of the plant operators. That would mean the absolute failure of civil proceedings in these types of cases.

Civil enforcement against certain types of Internet piracy has been impeded because of: (1) the delay (until September 2006) in implementing the critical copyright law amendments providing a right of making available; and (2) silence in Russian law on the issue of legal regulations or liability of Internet service providers for third-party activities.

Border Enforcement

Russia must significantly improve the lax border enforcement that permits the easy trafficking of illegal material into and out of Russia. The Government of Russia should direct customs officials to properly address this issue. One major flaw is that these officials do not have the proper and clear ex officio authority to commence criminal cases after making an inspection and seizure. Also, customs officials should be encouraged to consult and coordinate their actions with right holders’ organizations. There are numerous examples of Russian-made material being seized, not by Russian authorities who failed to detect illegal product, but by enforcement authorities in other countries (such as Poland). The music industry reports that Russian-made pirate CDs have been exported to over 25 countries. The entertainment software industry reports that Russian-sourced pirate video games are shipped into Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Israel. The Russian Federal Customs Service reported 270 administrative cases were brought against those trafficking in pirated goods in the first 9 months of 2005 (but only 75 of these were copyright violations; the rest were trademark cases).

Russian Government Efforts to Address Piracy

In 2002, the Russian government established an Inter-Ministerial Commission to combat piracy, which was, at least in theory, a positive step. The commission meets quarterly and is headed by the Prime Minister. In 2004, the government issued a “Working Plan of the Government Commission for Counteracting Intellectual Property Infringements” which it has begun to implement. Unfortunately, the government reorganization in 2004 stalled much of this implementation. To date, the commission has taken smaller steps, focusing on legislative reforms rather than focusing on the more important problem of combating optical disc production and retail piracy. The commission needs to get more decisive and focused on these key enforcement objectives, including the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive plan to stop the production and distribution of optical media, curtailing retail piracy, and finally by revisiting the question of a federal stamp for optical disc products.

Unfortunately, jurisdiction over IPR enforcement is scattered among many government agencies, including those responsible for policy and regulation (i.e., Rospatent) and others with
limited enforcement authority. Thus, there is no single agency responsible for IPR enforcement, nor a single key policymaker charged with authority to implement a comprehensive enforcement scheme. In addition, especially for IPR violations committed over the Internet, inexperience among the enforcers, including prosecutors and judges, is preventing effective enforcement.

One encouraging note in 2005 was the General Prosecutor’s initiative announced in September 2005 to better coordinate cases with other law-enforcement agencies (including the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Interior, the Federal Service of Security, the State Service for Control over Drugs, the Federal Customs Service and others). The goal is to coordinate and simplify the complex administrative, statutory, organizational and law enforcement measures to improve IPR enforcement efficiency.

GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES PROGRAM

Even with piracy rates and losses among the highest in the world, Russia continues to receive trade benefits from the U.S. government. In August 2000 IIPA filed a petition, accepted by the U.S. government in 2001, to examine whether Russia should continue to be eligible to receive duty-free trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences program. That petition is still pending; hearings were held in November 2005, October 2003, and March 2001. In 2004, $541 million worth of Russia’s imports to the United States benefited from the GSP program. During the first 11 months of 2005, $689.3 million worth of Russian goods entered the U.S. under the duty-free GSP code (an increase of 37.3% for the same period in 2004). While Russia was receiving these benefits, losses to U.S. industries from copyright piracy in Russia in 2005 amounted to over $1.75 billion. The IIPA recommends that Russia immediately lose its eligibility for GSP benefits until it improves its copyright enforcement regime.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE RUSSIAN LEGAL REGIME

Overview of Legal Reforms

There are a number of critical legal reforms that Russia must undertake to improve copyright protection and enforcement, as well as to ensure accession into the World Trade Organization. Since enforcement is the priority of the copyright industries in 2006, we simply list the legal reforms that are necessary at this time (and provide detailed requirements only for the much-needed optical media regulations). More details about the other legal reforms can be found in prior IIPA reports at http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html.

The legal reforms necessary for effective enforcement include:

- A proper optical media law to:
  - Close plants that are caught illegally producing copyrighted material.
  - Seize infringing product and machinery.
  - Require plants to keep meaningful order, production, and delivery records.
  - Require plants to adopt source identification (SID) codes so that the source of illegally produced discs can be traced.
  - Introduce sanctions (including criminal penalties) for infringing the regulations.
  - Control the importation of raw materials (optical grade polycarbonate) used in the production of optical disc media.
• More details of what proper regulations are necessary can be found at the IIPA website at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2003/2003SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf on page 14.

• Effective protection regarding the use of copyright materials on the Internet. This includes the immediate coming into force of an exclusive right of making available to the public for authors (i.e., a communication to the public right consistent with Article 8 of the WCT) and for phonogram producers (consistent with Article 14 of the WPPT).

• Amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code to provide proper ex officio authority and allow for the confiscation of equipment used to make illegal copyright materials.

• Amendments to strengthen the implementation of the Code on Administrative misdemeanors and apply deterrent fines, especially for legal entities and their officers.

• Amendments to the Customs Code to provide the proper ex officio seizure authority. We understand these provisions are scheduled for consideration in the Duma in March 2006.

• Amendments to the Copyright Law to ensure the adoption of responsible business practices by collecting societies to avoid abuses that harm right holders’ ability to exercise and enforce their own rights.

• Regulations that cover telecine operators (i.e., of film to video machinery) and film mastering labs.

• Introduction and enforcement of anti-camcording legislation that facilitates enforcement; provides for deterrent jail sentences and higher penalties for repeat offenders; and that ensures that anti-camcording measures are not undermined by the private copying exception.

Amendments to the Criminal Code (adopted in 2003) provided ex officio authority to allow prosecutors, but not the police, to commence and investigate certain IPR criminal cases. This was a part of the amendments to make prosecution of copyright-related cases a “public” matter, meaning it no longer requires a formal complaint from the right holder, although as a matter of practice such a complaint is still necessary (this was also part of a corresponding Criminal Procedure Code change to divide enforcement authority between the police and prosecutors). In September 2005, amendments to Article 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code were approved by the Government of Russia and introduced in the State Duma to enable the police also to have investigative jurisdiction of IPR cases (since the police actually do the investigations now and since the prosecutors are often backlogged with other serious crimes). We recommend the adoption of these amendments and others intended to provide law enforcement officials with additional investigative tools; we further recommend that Article 146 be amended to specify that legal entities can be criminally liable for IPR violations.

IIPA understands that the Supreme Court will adopt — perhaps as soon as February 2006 — a much-needed decree setting forth sentencing guidelines for judges, advising the courts to impose deterrent penalties as provided under the penal code (Article 146).

A major revision of the Civil Procedure Code (effective February 1, 2003) set the rules for initiating and examining civil cases, including disputes pertaining to copyright and
neighboring rights infringements. But unfortunately, the code still does not contain the necessary civil *ex parte* search procedures (required by the WTO TRIPS Agreement). These are essential tools for effective enforcement in the software industry. In 2002, an amended Arbitration Procedures Code in Article 72 introduced civil *ex parte* search provisions in a more limited context. The software industry reports that these provisions have to date only been tried one time in actual practice (although the case was cited by the High Arbitration Court as a *de facto* precedent); overall, the procedure remains a difficult and onerous proposition. Despite the fact that the Arbitration Procedure Code enables *ex parte* searches, the Russian arbitration courts are not utilizing *ex parte* measures. Unfortunately, during the late 1990s some plaintiffs misused these measures against potential defendants, and these unfair practices significantly discredited the use of *ex parte* searches in Russia.

A new Customs Code went into force on January 1, 2004, providing for measures to prevent the trade in counterfeit goods across borders. Unfortunately, border enforcement officials were not provided all of the necessary *ex officio* enforcement authority, to properly commence investigations. Additional amendments to the Code to provide the proper authority and procedures are scheduled for consideration in the Duma, perhaps as early as March 2006.

There are several remaining deficiencies in the Copyright Law (detailed in earlier IIPA reports), such as overly broad private copying exceptions, flawed provisions on technological protection measures (because they are linked to proof of a copyright infringement), and on collective management issues. For example, the poorly worded provisions in Article 45 permit collective management organizations to license rights and collect remuneration without a mandate from the right holders they purport to represent. This provision has been used, totally contrary to logic, by a local organization in St. Petersburg to deny motion picture producers (MPA) their own rights against pirated copies of their works, thus allowing piracy to flourish. This has also affected the music industry. The Inter-Ministerial Commission was asked to study the problems of collective rights management in Russia, so far without resolution.

IIPA recommends the introduction into the Copyright Law of a clear definition of “Internet Service Provider” and confirmation of clear (third party) liability in civil and criminal law for facilitating Internet piracy, as well as a duty to provide all necessary information to law enforcement agencies in Internet piracy cases.

IIPA recommends that any plant licensing regime should extend in scope to the operators of telecine machines and mastering laboratories used to pirate audiovisual works. Also, Russia needs to adopt anti-camcording legislation to facilitate the enforcement and prosecution (with jail sentences of a year or more for first offenses and longer terms for repeat offenders) for those involved in recording films from theater screens to use in pirate products.

IIPA is encouraged that the Code on Administrative Misdemeanors is being amended consistent with our past recommendations. In December 2005, amendments were adopted in the State Duma that will enter into force in 2006. These amendments (1) extend the timetable for pre-action investigation from the current two days to two months; (2) extend the statutory limitations to one year (from the current two months); and (3) increase the penalties for administrative violations of copyrights and related rights.

The threat of deleterious amendments in the Russian Civil Code pertaining to IPR protection remains, with the possibility of the latest draft being considered by the *Duma* in 2005.
Also interfering with the development of legitimate markets is the high taxation system on video rentals. Since 2002, a 24% profit tax on revenue from video rentals, along with other “vice” activities such as gambling, has been in effect. This tax is very high (although an improvement from the previous 70% rate). The Government of Russia felt that lowering the tax to 24% would help the video market's growth in Russia, but the lingering high rate combined with the growth of DVD piracy has, for the most part, overwhelmed the legitimate market for rentals.